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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OGDEN STANDARD EXAMINER and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF )
UTAH and LESLIE SKELTON and
)
T. R. CHENEY, co-conservators )
for the dependent children of )
)
CLIFFORD CHENEY, deceased,
)
)
Defendants.

Case No. 18311

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants adopt Plaintiff's statement as to the nature
of the case, disposition by the Industrial Commission, and
their relief sought on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The deceased was killed in an automobile collision on a
Utah highway on March 22, 1980, while traveling toward his
home in Ogden, Utah, after attending the 1980 Governor's
Ball held at Salt Lake City, Utah.

At the time of his death

he was 38 years old, his wife, who died in the same accident,
was 35 years old.

They were the parents of two minor dependent

children, ages 8 and 10, for whose benefit this application
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was filed before the Industrial commission.
The deceased at the time in question, and for approximately
nine months prior thereto, had been the managing editor of
the Ogden Standard Examiner newspaper.
He and his wife had been invited to attend the Governor's
Ball by Mrs. Wilda Jean Hatch, president of the Standard
Corporation, which corporation owns the Ogden Standard
Examiner (R. 238-239).

The Cheneys had driven their own

automobile to the Hatches' residence in Salt Lake City, and
after some social cordialities went to the ball with Mr.
George Hatch, Mrs. Wilda Jean Hatch, and Randall Hatch
(their son, also an employee of the Ogden Standard Examiner)
and his wife.

After the ball the three couples returned to

the Hatches' residence, spent another short period and then
the deceased, with his wife, commenced their fatal journey
toward Ogden.
The Governor's Ball is primarily a fund raising event
(R. 157) and is principally attended by business, labor and
community leaders, and is generally attended by those people
in order to further business interests (R. 158, 159, 160,
164, 170, 172).

It is an activity in which business leaders

particularly attend to "see and be seen" (R. 159, 172).
Attendance is seldom viewed as a social activity (R. 174).
Those for whom a table was arranged and tickets supplied
were exclusively managers of the various businesses owned by
the Hatches (R. 248).

Clifford Cheney, as managing editor
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of the Ogden Standard Examiner, had no particular political
alignment or preferences (R. 178, 194), nor was Cheney
particularly an outgoing or social type of individual (R.
177-178).

He was nevertheless described as a dedicated

business and newspaper man (R. 180, 185, 194).

Just prior

to the night in question he had been heavily engaged in
preparation of an anticipated publication of a certain
newspaper article which, because of its sensitive matter,
had recently fallen under criticism of management on a
higher level than himself (R. 189, 195, 210).

The major

stated purposes for attendance at the ball by the deceased
was for the purpose of rubbing shoulders with the "big wigs"
and because management wanted him to (R. 187).

The very

last conversation prior to his leaving for the ball was with
two reporters for the Ogden Standard Examiner who were
working with him on the above mentioned article and that he
was going to the ball in hopes for a chance to encourage
acceptance by the Hatches of the disputed article (R. 197,

l99, 200, 201, 203, 204).
During the week prior to his death, the deceased had
visiting with him and his wife in their home, Mrs. Cheney's
sister and her husband, Pam and Steve Skelton from Eugene,
Oregon {R. 205).

Despite the fact that the visit was an

annual affair and the couple had a close relationship, the deceased
was unable to spend much time with the visitors because of
the pressures of work and specifically the completion of the
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article in question (R. 198, 200, 201, 202, 210).

The night

of the ball was also the last night of the Skeltons' visit,
and the deceased told his wife that he would attend the ball
whether she did or not (R. 212).
It appeared from the testimony that it was exceedingly
important for him to attend in order to spend time with the
Hatches, the owners of the newspaper (R. 217).

The deceased

stated prior to his death that he felt the ball offered an
opportunity to discuss and clarify with the Hatches newspaper
policy (R. 217, 228).

Prior to attendance at the ball, he

rented a tuxedo for the occasion, which rental cost he
considered a business expense (R. 218).

He expressed to the

Skeltons on the night of his death that he needed to discuss
the paper and policy with the Hatches and get an understanding
of their philosophies and policies on the content and other
positions on editorial contents of the paper and publications
of the article in question (R. 149, 229).
The general manager of the Ogden Standard Examiner and
the deceased's immediate supervisor was Mr. Jack Banks (R.
272, 283).

It was he who had taken charge of the affairs of

the family and funeral arrangements the morning after the
deaths, and it was he, as he testified, who would be involved
in insurance claims and the like concerning the paper and
its employees (R. 235, 272, 283).

At the home of the deceased

the day after the accident, when told by the decedent's
father that he, the decedent's father, felt the accident
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arose out of a business trip, Banks replied that he did not
see a problem with that and "that the paper's insurance
should cover it" (R. 234).
The Hatches, who invited the Cheneys to the event, are
in their 60's.

They testified that in their mind the occasion

was a social event wherein they invited the Cheneys and
their son and his wife in order that they may get better
acquainted.

The invitation extended to the Cheneys was made by Mrs.
Hatch at the office of the Ogden Standard Examiner.

Testimony

of the Hatches stresses that at the ball and during the
visits at the Hatch home, business was neither discussed nor
conducted (R. 246, 261, 276).
ARGUMENT
I

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF
FACT FULLY SUPPORT ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION
THAT CLIFFORD CHENEY'S DEATH AROSE OUT
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
As early as 1936 in the case of Jones v. Industrial
Commission, 90 Utah 121, 61 P.2d 10 (1936), as cited by the
Plaintiffs, this Court held in reviewing an order of the
Industrial Commission it will examine the findings of fact
by the Commission in light of the issue of law raised by the

claim in order to determine whether such an award is supported
by the findings.

The Court is to review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commission's findings {Entwistle Company
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 1981), and cases cited therein)
and support the Commission's findings unless clearly arbitrary
or capricious (Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah
174, 246 P. 698 (1926)).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1953) provides that the
dependents of an employee "who [is] killed by an accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment" are
entitled to workmen's compensation benefits.

Whether Clifford

P. Cheney died as a result of "an accident arising out of or
in the course of his employment • • • " depends on the particular
circumstance of the case, Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609
P.2d 926 (1980).

Although there existed no written job

description, it may well be agreed that the customary place
of decedent's employment was the newspaper office.

A

newsman,

however, would be well expected to be found on job elsewhere
and certainly a managing editor would be expected to carry
on the affairs of his office wherever necessary and opportune.
Certainly the essential thing is that there be some substantial
relationship between the activity engaged in and the carrying
on of the employer's business, Askren v. Industrial Commission,
15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302 (1964).
As argued by the Plaintiff, in a case where an employee
whose place and hours at work are fixed, it is usually not
difficult to ascertain whether an accident arises out of or
in the course of his employment.

The more difficult questions

are presented when there exists no written job description
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and where the time and work are flexible, as in this case.
An employee even away from the customary and regular place
of employment and duties thereof may nevertheless be covered
by workmen's compensation insurance.

Those situations arise

when an employee is upon the special mission of the employer
and the generally accepted rule remains that:
That an injury sustained by an employee,
either on his employer's or his own time,
arises out of his employment if the
employee is injured while on a mission
for his employer.
Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 46, 207 P.2d 1116
(1949).

This Court has adopted the concept that what is and

what is not a special mission for the employer may depend
upon the characterization of the employee's duties and those
obligations which naturally flow from its work.

In the case

of Hafers, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 526 P.2d 1188
(1974), this Court stated:
The scope of one's employment includes
not only those things which are direct
and primary duties of the assigned
job; but also those things which are
reasonably necessary and incidental
thereof.
The Plaintiff in its brief cited extensively from
Professor Arthur Larson in his treatise, Workmen's Compensation
Law, hereinafter referred to as "Larson."

Larson is recognized

as the leading authority in this field and the Defendant
takes no exception to the references cited therein by Plaintiff,
except that as to their interpretation of paragraph 3 of
Larson's statement in Volume lA, § 22, page 5, Point 41.
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The employer need not derive some substantial benefit directly
from the activity but the intent must be that some benefit
be derived.

It is certainly feasible that in any employment

situation an employee could be sent on an errand, the result
of which would be futile, but the benefit nevertheless was
intended and therefore the activity would be considered
within the scope of the employment.

Such a test has been

adopted by the Utah Court in the case of Martinson v. W. M.
Insurance Agency, 606 P.2d 256 {1980).

Although the decision

in that case held against the applicant on a combined business
and social function, the facts can easily be distinguished
from this case.
applicant.

The law, however, lies in favor of this

This Court, after discussion of the applicable

law {and with which this applicant has no quarrel) concluded
that the main reason for the trip to Park City in that case
was for pleasure and that the applicant did not go to Park
City for the primary purpose of conducting business, nor was
there anything to be done at Park City that could not be
done over the telephone and without leaving his office in
Salt Lake City, and essentially that the applicant went
~

there only because he wanted to and not necessarily to
further the interests of the employer.

That case is substantially

different from this one on the facts and it is certainly
understandable why this Court held as it did.
In this case, however, Cheney's primary motivation in
attending the ball was far from social.

The argument on
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pages 10 and 11 of the Plaintiff's brief relative to social
activities, parties, games, etc. as discussed in Larson have
very little, if any applicability in this case, nor has this
Court expressly adopted Larson "test" of compensability of
accidents which arise out of social events.
The Plaintiff further cites the cases of Prouse v.
Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (1980), and Lundberg v.
Cream 0 Weber Dairy Farms, 24 Utah 2d 16, 465 P.2d 175
(1970), neither of which cases hold any relationship to the
case at issue.

In the first case the Court denied the same

on the basis that workmen's compensation coverage only
provides coverage for those activities in which an employee
is reasonably required to engage in the performance of his
duties and which directly and intangibly benefit his employer.
In that case, of course, horseplay did not.

In the latter

case, the Court specifically found that the deceased was in
travel to and from work and, of course, this Court, and
many others, has held that such an activity does not in and
of itself qualify.

The specific exception to that rule,

however, is where the employee is engaged in a special mission
or activity.

Cudahay Packing Company v. Industrial Commission,

60 Utah 161, 207 P.2d 148 (1922).
The Plaintiffs also cite the case of Wilson v. Industrial
Commission, supra, in contending that the law therein applies
to this case.

We readily agree.

The facts, of course, in

that case are substantially different; nevertheless, the
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principle of law is still applicable and accepted by the
Defendant.
This is not a case raising issues of law.
of facts.

It is a case

The law is well established that there is a

special omission exception to the travel to and from work,
and this Court is simply called upon to determine whether
there is a substantial relationship between the activity
engaged in, i.e., the special errand or mission and the
carrying on the employer's business.
This case, however, turns on one additional and extremely
important fact, and that is that the deceased was in a
managerial position and as such made his own decisions as to
what he should do and

what he should not do in furtherance

of the employer's business, and he had fully in mind the
intention of furthering said employer's business in using
the Governor's Ball for such an opportunity.
In this regard, it should be understood at the outset
that the Defendants have no argument with the established
law in the State of Utah, and their position is simply that
the facts of this case fall well within the established law,
and as determined by the Industrial Commission, is fully
compensable.
In this analysis, it is instructive to review the
function and purpose of the Governor's Ball, the factors
relating to the deceased's attendance thereto, and the
purpose for the same.
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The tickets were purchased by the Hatches and held
only by managers of the Hatches' businesses.

The two persons

invited to attend were the managing editor and the promotion
director of the Ogden Standard Examiner.

The difference in

ages between the Hatches and the Cheneys was almost 30
years (Tr. 122.17-123.60), the invitation thereto was made
on the job by an officer of the Ogden Standard Examiner.
Two entirely unattached and presumably entirely unbiased
witnesses, Maggie Wilde, the Governor's former press secretary,
and Kent Briggs, the executive assistant to the Governor,
are probably as highly qualified persons as can be found to
testify relative to the Governor's Ball and those who generally
attend.

Each testified that business people attend to

further business interests, that the ball is generally a
fund-raising event attended by business, labor and community
leaders where they can see and be seen and who go there to
have doors opened to them in the business world and for
their business interests.

The apparent major reasons that

people have for attending the Governor's Ball are political
and business.

But it should be remembered that Cheney is

described as having no political alignment and was essentially
apolitical.

It can be safely concluded that he did not

attend for political reasons.

The fact that the tickets

were held and a table reserved only for managers of the
Hatches' companies is even more significant, and is the
plethora of testimony as to the deceased's uttered intentions

-11-
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for attending the ball.
It is undisputed that the deceased intended on attending
the Governor's Ball that night specifically for the purpose
of rubbing elbows with the big wigs and because management
wanted him to {Tr. 39:5-12).

Even more importantly, the

event was an opportunity for him to discuss with the owners
of the paper management policies relating specifically to
the article in question.

Even his very last conversation

with the two reporters who were working with him on the
article was that he was going to the ball in hopes for a
chance to encourage acceptance by the Hatches of his disputed
article.

So important did this seem that he denied himself,

with or without his wife, the opportunity of further visiting
with family friends in order to attend the ball.
It is difficult to construe that such a decision would
turn only on social reasons.

It was stated emphatically

that it was extremely important for him to go and spend time
with the Hatches, the owners of the paper.

Cheney felt the

ball offered the opportunity to discuss and clarify policy.
Even the tuxedo rental was considered by him as a business
expense.

He was unequivocal the night before his death in

stating that he needed to discuss the paper with the Hatches
to gain an understanding of their philosophies and policies
on content and other positions of editorial matters of the
paper, and that the ball would present that opportunity.
Even Jack Banks, the general manager of the Ogden Standard
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Examiner, apparently considered the Cheneys' attendance at
the ball to be business related.

Such, of course, would not

be the case had he considered it only to be a social event.
It is clear that in the mind of the employee that he as
manager would attend the Governor's Ball in order to further
the interests of his employer by discussing the publication
of the article and gaining an understanding as to their
editorial policies.

An analysis of the facts of this case

can lead to no other conclusion but that the deceased intended
on accepting the invitation to the Governor's Ball by his
employer for reasons directly related to the interests of
that employer and to the benefit of the newspaper.

For the

Plaintiffs to argue that the same was only a social event
and therefore not compensable ignores really all essential facts
in question.
There can only be one conclusion drawn from the Commission's
findings and the evidence presented, and that is that Clifford
Cheney considered attendance at that event to be within the
course of his employment, necessary for his employment, and
an intrical part thereof, and that the employer's business
would be conducted and furthered by attendance thereat.
Plaintiffs seem to rely heavily on the point that no conversation
occurred relative to business purposes.

It should be noted,

however, that whether any were engaged in is not the test.
The test is rather whether the employee was there with the
intention and capability of conducting business of the
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employer.

There can be no other conclusion drawn than that

is the exact reason he was there and the only reason he
attended.
II
THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE
DECEASED'S DEATH AROSE OUT OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
The Plaintiff raises in its Point II of argument that
the deceased attended the Governor's Ball at the request of
the Hatches and that such a request was social in nature.
Despite the fact the Hatches testified that in their mind
this was no more than a social invitation and this is hardly
the only inquiry which need be made in this case.

The

Plaintiff appears mesmerized over the apparent three prong
test of Professor Larson in that this was a social event,
though not sponsored by the Ogden Standard Examiner, that
Cheney's attendance was not specifically required, and the
tickets were not purchased or paid for by the employer, nor
that any claim was made that it was an employee benefit to
which Mr. Cheney was entitled.

None of these factors are

important in a question to be decided.
What is important are the reasons that Cheney attended.
It must be noted from the outset that the event in question
was not a social arrangement, as the Defendant would have
the Court believe.

The tickets were not purchased by social

friends, but by the heads of the Hatches' several businesses.
And although Mrs. Hatch did testify that she had no business
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purpose in mind in inviting the deceased to the ball, it is
apparent that other considerations were in the mind of the
deceased when he accepted the invitation.

The tone of

interchange as argued by the Plaintiff between Cheney and
Mrs. Hatch is not determinative as to the purpose for his
attending.

Nor the fact that he needed to check with his

wife, as he told his wife that he would attend whether she
did or not.

With respect to supervisory personnel and any

conduct on their part making it mandatory for Cheney to
attend, it must be remembered that he in fact was supervisory
personnel, that he determined when and where he should go
for the benefit of the paper.

Nor does the fact that Cheney

had any public relations responsibilities make any difference
in this case.

It has been the applicant's position all

along that he did not attend for public relations nor as a
social event, but in order to discuss a pertinent article
and publication thereof, together with editorial policy,
with the Hatches.

It is helpful, however, to note that the

Hatches presented Mr. Cheney to dignataries such as Congressman
Gunn McKay and Mayor Steve Dirks (R. 262, 280).

The Hatches

and Cheneys, because of the substantial difference in age,
were not particularly social friends (R. 254, 269) nor was
there any testimony that was the case, and no other viable
explanation by the Hatches given for the invitation to be
extended that night except that it was a result and in
connection with and for business purposes.
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It should also be remembered in reviewina_, Professor
Larson's "test" that an invitation from a boss can certainly
take the aura of a command to attend, coupled with other
factors.

The other factors in this case are the editorial

policy and pressure for publication of a sensitive article.
It would appear that the Plaintiff's argument really

falls on the basis that blue collar workers are compensated
for injuries suffered on the job simply because their job
description and location for work is generally easily
defined, and that managerial employees are denied workmen's
compensation benefits because their work and their activities
may be expanded to more than certain hours at certain places.
Though Clifford Cheney was not self-employed, he was nevertheless
in a managerial position where he made decisions for the
benefit of the newspaper and specifically respecting editorial
policy and publication.

In this case, his stated and unequivocal

intent was to attend that ball for the very purpose of
discussing that editorial policy and publication with his
supervisor.
Does the Plaintiff concede that if in fact he were to
take a special trip for his employer away from the Ogden
Standard Examiner off ice in order to conduct that discussion,
and if in fact the discussion did not take place once he
arrived, and he was killed on the way home, that he would
not be compensated?

Certainly the fact that the discussion

was to occur at a social event such as the Governor's Ball
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does not deny compensation to the two children of the deceased.
It is argued by the Plaintiff that Jack Banks, the
deceased's immediate supervisor, had direction and control
over the activities of the deceased and that since he did
not specifically tell the deceased that he should go to the
ball, therefore it is not covered.

On the contrary, it was

Mr. Banks himself who admitted the day after the accident
that in fact Mr. Cheney's activities were covered and that
the paper's insurance should provide compensation.

To argue

that the Industrial Commission has misconstrued the law in
this case is missing the point of this entire appeal.

The

appeal is one based on facts, whether the facts in this case
fall within the principle of law enunciated by this Court.
Plaintiff further argues that such an affirmation of
the Industrial Commission's award would have an onerous
effect upon workmen's compensation law in this state.

It

should consider the onerous effect such a denial would have
upon the children of the deceased.

Their father was engaged

in work attending the event for the purpose of discussing
and furthering the interests of the employer and was killed,
together with his wife, while engaged in such activity.
Plaintiff's argument that if this case becomes law it would
create a strikingly difficult standard of compensability is
far from the mark.

The standard has already been established

that the activity must be within the scope of or arising out
of his employment.

The facts of this case show specifically
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case falls within such imaginable cases as refreshment
breaks of co-workers, golf matches and lunch excursions is
not only grossly unfair, it ignores the facts and is in poor
taste.

Not only is the argument inapplicable and unfinished,

but certainly there are cases and circumstances where those
kinds of events would be activities in which injuries would
be compensable.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from

this case is that when going back to the original definition
of a compensable injury being one that arose out of or in
the course of his employment, Mr. Cheney was certainly
engaged in his employment and was attending that event
specifically for the purpose of discussing the newspaper
publication and editorial policy with his immediate supervisors,
and there is no other evidence but that those are the reasons
he attended.
The Plaintiff freely speculates that Clifford Cheney
attended for social reasons only, when there is absolutely
no evidence that he did.

The Plaintiff produced absolutely

no evidence to show that the deceased's intended attendance
thereat was anything but for business and no evidence was
produced to show that any motivation he had whatsoever was
for social purposes.
III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AWARD IS
BASED ON COMPETENT AND ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE.
The Plaintiff argues in Point III that the decision by
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the Industrial Commission was based entirely upon hearsay
evidence and therefore apparently incompetent evidence.
This Court has long held that hearsay evidence is
admissible, material and competent, Columbia Steel v.
Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937);
Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132
P.2d 376 (1942), and it is certainly agreed that the Court
has further held that a finding cannot be based solely on
hearsay evidence but must be supported by a residum of legal
evidence competent in a court of law.
v. W.

s.

Sandy State Bank

Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481 (Utah 1981).

Though it is

true that the administrative law judge received extensive
evidence from two reporters who worked with Cheney and were
with him just hours before his death and also that of the
deceased's brother-in-law and sister-in-law, who were also
with him the week prior to and just hours prior to his
death, such evidence, although persuasive, substantial and
competent, was not the only evidence upon which the Commission
based its award.

The argument made by the Plaintiff that

statements as to the deceased's state of mind are inadmissible
do not square with the specific provision of this Court
allowing hearsay evidence nor does it follow Rule 63(12)
Utah Rules of Evidence.

State of mind is specifically an

issue in this case.
The rule specifically allows hearsay evidence to the
declarant's ''intent, plan, motive, design • • • • "
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The intent

is exactly what we are here concerned with.

The case of

State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977), is inapplicable
to the issues herein.
The second argument by Plaintiff that the evidence
admitted was incompetent is that the opinion as evidenced by
an apparent lack of understanding the relevance of the testimony
of Briggs and Wilde, was apparently not the testimony of
experts.

It is difficult to conceive of two individuals

who would be more expert in the fields in which they were
called to testify than these two individuals.

Rule 56 of

the Utah Rules of Evidence specifically provides for testimony
from these type of individuals.

With respect to the qualifications

thereof, the Court refers specifically to Transcript, pages
9 through 24.

The Plaintiff's quotation of Mr. Brigg's

testimony is not only incomplete but entirely unfair as it
does not take into account his complete testimony as foundational
testimony for his expertise and it completely ignores that
of Mrs. Wilde.
The Plaintiff's argument that no theory was advanced by
the Defendant as to the relevance of the testimony of Briggs
and Wilde seems to miss the entire point, as the Plaintiff
has done throughout this case.

The point is, from the

testimony received that this event was not a social event
but was a business event and that very few people attend it
for social purposes but mostly for business and political
purposes.

The Plaintiffs have argued that the Hatches
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attended for social purposes only, which may be the case
with them, but was certainly a very unusual situation and
cannot be patently applied to the deceased.

It is necessary

in this case for the Court to review the entire transcript

of this matter in order to become familiar with all the
facts in question.

The Plaintiff's quotations from the

transcript here and there hardly informs the Court as to all
the facts pertinent herein.

This case has a bulwark of non-

hearsay, not just a residum, upon which the award can be
founded.

Specifically, Cheney was employed by the Defendant

several months prior to and was so employed on the day of
his death; that his was a position of manager for which the
employer had no written or detailed job description; that
the Governor's Ball to which he was to attend and generally
attended not so much for social reasons but for political
and business purposes; that Cliff Cheney was essentially a
non-socialite and both personally and professionally apolitical;
that he had been at the time of the ball working strenuously
to complete and gain approval for publication of a controversia:
article; that his employer had rejected as too sensitive the
article for publication; that others at the paper had hoped
that he would use the time at the ball with the Hatches to
gain approval for publication; that it is for the above
purpose that they (co-workers and reporters) thought he was
attending the ball; that he and his wife had company staying
at their home, yet chose to attend the Ball despite the fact
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that it was their last night together; that Cliff Cheney
appeared to be agitated and concerned about the publication
of the article and the meeting with the Hatches; that he had
rented a tuxedo for the ball, the cost of which appeared to
be a concern to his wife, which concern was apparently laid
to rest with the comment by the deceased about it being a
business expense; that the Hatches were at least 30 years
the Cheneys' senior and not social friends; that the tickets
to the Ball were supplied to or from the heads of the Hatch
business organization only; that the invitation was made at
the business office; that upon discussing the problem after
the accident, the Defendant's general manager, Banks, admitted
that the matter was work connected and the business insurance
would take care of it.
The above facts standing alone would be sufficient to
sustain an order of the administrative law judge, but the
findings become overwhelmingly conclusive when supported by
other competent and admissible evidence.

That Cheney thought

he had been invited for business purposes; that he needed to
go to discuss editorial policy with the owner of the paper
and to achieve approval for publication of a controversial
article; that he felt is so necessary to attend that he
would go with or without his wife; that he would go even
though it meant the last evening that they had with their
in-laws; that he considered the rental of a tuxedo a business
expense; that for two days prior to and up to the very last
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discussion he had with his co-employees and reporters, that
it was his and their concern that he attend the ball to sell
the Hatches on the article; that he was going because the
owners wanted him to go; he intended to use the opportunity
for the Defendant newspaper business.
Against all the above stated facts, the Plaintiffs can
site only two; that the Hatches intended the invitation to
be a social event, and that during the course of the evening
the article and newspaper business were not discussed.
The law of this jurisdiction is that whether an employee
is within the scope of his employment depends upon all the
facts of a particular case.

The three prong rule referred

to as Larson's Rule is not his rule at all, and a careful
reading of the text thereof as cited in the Defendant's
brief aptly demonstrates the fallacy and lack of depth of
Plaintiff's position.

That in fact the deceased did attend

the ball with the intent of performing a service for his
employer.

There can be no other conclusion rendered by the

facts of this case but that the deceased was attending that
ball with one purpose in mind, and that was for the benefit
of his employers, that he was within the scope of his employment,
that the accident arose out of his employment and is compensable.
CONCLUSION
The presumption must lie in favor of the findings made
by the Commission.

This Court has reiterated the principle

numerous times that:
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• • . in reviewing a record every
legitimate inference which can arise
from the evidence must be drawn in
favor of the employee where the
Commission has made findings and
award in his favor.
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah
220, 284 P. 313 (1929).

See also Entwistle Company v. Wilkins,

supra, and cases cited therein.
Taken in total, factors giving rise to the attendance
at the Governor's Ball, can lead this Court only to reasonably
conclude from a preponderance of the evidence that the
decedent, Clifford P. Cheney, considered it his duty to
attend the evening's activities.

That he did so with the

intent in mind of furthering the employer's business interest
and that his attendance clearly resulted in an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Therefore,

the decision of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.

Dated this

C:~ay

of August, 1982.
HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON

Attorney for Defendants
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